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REPORT AND INTERPRETATION OF THE WORLD CONFERENCE OF RELIGIOUS
WORKERS FOR SAVING THE SACRED G IFT OF LIFE FROM NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE
Moscow, USSR; May 10-14, 1982
by
H. Lamar Gibble and James E. Will
Several persons long active in CAREE had the privilege of participation in
the inter-religious conference on nuclear disarmament held in Moscow May 10-14,
and we owe our colleagues and the readers of OPREE a description and interpretation
of that event which can penetrate the miasma of media misinterpretation that has
almost totally distorted the American perception of it. We also place in your ha�ds
in this issue of OPREE the three documents that emerged from the work of the
conference as Appeals: 1) An Appeal to the Leaders and Followers of all Religions; '
2) Appeal to all Governments o f the World; and 3) Appeal to the Second Special
Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament. We think them worthy of study
and discussion.
Lamar Gibble, Peace and International Affairs Consultant for the Church of
the Brethren, Elgin, Illinois, shares his experience and evaluation of the conference,
as well as his critique of the efforts of the U. S . government and media to distort
and politicize it. James Will, Professor of Systematic Theology and Director of
the Peace Institute at Garrett-Evangelical -Theological Seminary, Evanston, Illinois,
shares his systematic reflections about the conference.

H. Lamar Gibble
When I accepted the invitation to attend the World Conference of Religious
Workers at the invitation of Patriarch Pimen, head of the Russian Orthodox Church,
I never dreamed it would attra.ct so much attention on the part of the U. S. media,
or for that matter, the Reagan administration.
But it did grab much more attention
than any other similar disarmament conference initiated by Christian and/or
interreligious leaders in recent times.
In this report I will not bother to give details about the final formulations
since they speak for themselves in the Communique, the Appeal to Leaders and
Followers of all Religions, the Appeal to All Governments of the �.Jorld, and the
Appeal to the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament-1982.
In this report I will simply summarize my impressions, criticisms and commendations
of the conference along with a few asides and happenings which color such an event.
The conference followed the East European pattern of speeches and more
speeches. . . some mainly greetings, some quite focused on the theme, and some merely
ideological rhetoric, grasping at an opportunity to give attention to one's
religious group, denomination, or organization. That went on for most of the
conference and many of the delegates were getting quite impatient by Wednesday when
greetings \\ere still being interspersed with the main speeches, the conference was
falling behind its schedule, and persons wanted to get on with the tasks in the
working groups. Many were so impatient with the drone of the speeches and some of
the rhetoric that they (we) began interrupting some persons with table pounding
and groans when speakers went overtime or simply were scoring 'brownie' points
with the Soviet government. I do not know if it was. reported in the press but
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there was not a polite and quiet acceptance on the part of the delegates of
these few incidents of strident political rhetoric.
There were some notable and good speeches. The Patriarch's speech got
quite a bit of attention in the news releases we received almost daily from the
U.S. Embassy. It was probably the longest speech and was filled with biblical
and theological wanderings but it concluded with a rather short section which
could be characterized as political.
It was this section alone, I think, which
was picked up by the press and exploited although most of us saw this as mild
political rhetoric and likely the minimum he could get away with in return for
the approval of the state to organize such an-interreligious conference.
Billy Graham's speech was well done, I thought. I was pleasantly surprised.
While he was not as bold as some of us would have liked, he brought attention
to the gravity and dangers of the nuclear arms race in an acceptable biblical/
theological context and, I think, was genuinely appreciated by most all present
(Christians at least) . Even his last minute insertion (not in the printed text
of his speech) on human rights and religious liberty issues was set in the
context of CSCE/the Helsinki Final Act and was tastefully and helpfully done.

There were other rather good speeches too. One of the problems was that the
good material soon became repetitive.
I felt Dr. Arbatov, Director of the
Institute for the U.S. & Canada of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, gave a good
and balanced speech given the necessity of a pro-Soviet bent because of his posi
tion. I was equally interested that he politely challenged Billy Graham's comments
that linked 11the last, all destructive war, 11 with the 11second coming of Christ. 11
Arbatov then went on to enunciate a position that might be closer to mine in that
regard than to Billy Graham's. A Japanese woman, Michie Kurokawa, a survivor of
. Hiroshima bomb gave a very moving account of her harrowing experience and made a
plea for nuclear disarmament. Arie Brouwer's speech was short, powerful, and did
honor to the U. S. delegation.
JoAnne Kagiwada's speech (our current ICIC chair
person) was warmly received, as much for her interpretation of the 1,000 cranes
(folded paper cranes connected in lei form and given by the Japanese woman to
Patriarch Pimen without explanation) as for her interpretation of the current
status of the peace and disarmament movement within the U. S. churches.
Although the conference was grossly monotonous for much of the time, it had
its moments of stimulation, confrontation, and backroom negotiation. Two times
the conference speeches were interrupted on behalf of the InterChurch Peace Council
(IKV) of the Netherlands, whose representative came with the understanding that
he would be able to address the conference, but then was denied the privilege
and told by the chair that he would have the floor in the working groups. With all
of the other speeches and greetings many of us could not understand why he was
denied.
Even given some real dissatisfaction on my part related to some of the struc
ture and format of the conference, I came away with a quite positive overall view
of the conference. The final documents, affirmed by consensus, were much better
than I expected. They are no more 11radical11 or 11reactionary11 in my estimation
than the proposals emerging from the disarmament movements in the U. S. and Europe.
And the process of producing these final statements was not all that bad and

3

certainly not the "closed and Soviet manipulated" operation that the Western
press presented it to be. At the presentation of and in response to the first
drafts of these documents, there were over 100 verbal and written interventions
for change or modification which were considered before the final drafts were
presented in the closing plenary.
It is my impression that there were genuine
and successful efforts via the interventions, corridor lobbying, and consulta
tions by the drafting committee to negotiate acceptable modifications of the
texts. Therefore, when the final texts were presented on Friday there was a
consensus to accept them as proposed.
My main criticism and irritation related to matters not central to the
conference but certainly related to it. My first irritation relates to the
role the Reagan administration chose to play vis a vis the conference.
Before
I left the United States I had a long letter from Representative Fascell and
Senator Dole, critical of the conference, filled with inaccuracies, and asking
that I raise human rights and religious liberties issues in the conference. The
day before I left I had a call from Hugh Simon of the Human Rights Bureau,
Department of State, asking me to press the Soviet government while there to
release the "Siberian Seven (now six) . " In my absence another letter arrived
from a different person in the Human Rights Bureau raising similar concerns.
While in Moscow we learned that delegates from at least three other countries
(we have documentation from Canada and the Netherlands) were called by U.S.
Embassy staff in those countries urging them not to attend the conference . Even
before we left the U.S. the press had reported the efforts on behalf of the
Administration to convince Billy Graham not to go to the conference . While many
of us have been to many other such conferences of rather major importance,
never before have we had this type of pressure and activity on the part of our
government. We also know that the U.S. Embassy in Moscow was "doing intelligence"
on the conference as it was in its planning stages and that that information
which was shared with Washington from these sources apparently was the basis of
some or many of the inaccurate statements in the government press releases and
.
letters we received.
(If the U.S. intelligence work in general is as poor as it
In short, I was
was on this international conference, then what can we believe!)
extremely irritated by all of this and believe strongly that many of these actions
were inappropriate and plans are underway to officially lodge this sentiment with
I came away from
appropriate persons, departments, and agencies of government.
the experience feeling that there seemed to be a profound ignorance on part of
most of the embassy staff about the nature of the conference. Furthermore, there
seems to be an abysmal ignorance of most staff at the U.S. Embassy of the daily
It appears
life, witness, and history of the Christian Church in the U.S.S.R .
to me as if they are primarily interested in and tuned in only to the religious
dissidents and the points at which the church is in tension or conflict with the
state. Their knowledge and work, it seems, focuses primarily on matters which suit
the U.S. political agenda.
·

Another major irritation I had was with the press. No sooner had I arrived
in Moscow than I learned that the Chicago Tribune Moscow correspondent wanted to
meet with the three Chicago area delegates. From his opening questions in the
interview it was obvious that he had predetermined his focus for the story.
It
would be about our reactions to Graham's presence, human rights concerns, and
whether or not we felt we were being used as tools for Soviet propaganda. And from
what we learned of the U.S. electronic and print press corps in Moscow, this was
pretty true to form. What is deemed newsworthy is predetermined in advance and

4
the questions (interrogations) never allow you to get to your experiences or
the announced agenda of the conference. By the time I got back to the U.S.
I was so irritated by this and the loaded questions thrown at us that I responded
to an AP interviewee's question, "Do you think Billy Graham was used by the Soviets
for their purposes?'', as follows: "No more than you or the Reagan Administration
have used Graham for your/their purposes." I have become more cynical about the
press through this experience than I have ever been before. The things I have
read since I have returned have convinced me further that they reported on their
biases or on the basis of what would sell rather than having knowledge or experience
of what the conference was about, what happened there, and what the final papers
stated. The harsh critique of Patriarch Pimeq's address, I feel, could only have
been written in ignorance (not having heard or read the speech) or with malice
(intentionally distorting and taking a short statement out of the larger context
of the speech). Furthermore, the U.S. press in Moscow seemed appallingly ignorant
of the life of the churches in the U.S.S.R., maybe even more so than the Embassy
crowd, and even more blinded by their focus on and contacts with the "dissidents."
Still another irritant related to the focus on Billy Graham. Without it
being his intention (I think and hope) the focus of the conference (nuclear
disarmament) got lost in the glare of international attention given to "Billy."
When it was announced many months ago that he might be invited, some of us raised
this very concern and I have been told that the concern was raised during the
planning process, but apparently "the Russians" really wanted him there. I am glad
he went. I am happy he is concerned about nuclear disarmament ( I think genuinely
so). But a price was paid in the process in that the media's focus shifted primarily
to a person and not nuclear disarmament. Indeed if there was an "issue focus" in
the media, it was on human rights and religious liberty issues and not on nuclear
disarmament. Therefore, it is difficult to discern who won this round, the Soviet
government or the U.S. government. Therefore, if some of these assessments and
intuitions are correct, maybe Bishop David Preus's appeal in the conference to keep
the conference within the confines of our religious concern and preventing it from
becoming a "political forum," is an impossible dream. For how can we avoid the
political dynamics and realities? And if we could, would not the governments and
the press of both great powers impose their political agendas and biases on such
an event anyhow?
I came away from the conference again convinced that there is a genuine and
abiding and deep concern for peace and disarmament on the part of the Soviet
people and church leaders and that it is not simply being fabricated to subvert us.
I came away convinced again of the continuing need for meetings and dialogue between
Christians and other religious leaders in these types of fora. There are certainly
better ways of working for peace in the West than through such a big cumbersome,
and costly conference, but given the Soviet setting, I am not sure that anything
much better could have been done than was done and so I am generally positive in
my evaluation and estimate of the event and very happy to have been invited and
a part of it.
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James E. Will
I.

Presuppositions of the Conference
A. Shared presuppositions of the planners and participants:
1.

2.

3.

4.

B.

Apparent presuppositions of the Soviet Hosts:
1.

2.

3.

C.

Human life is a sacred gift, which re quires responsible safe
guarding despite and in the midst of all historical ambiguities
of national security, competing ideologies, and international
injustice.
The globally destructive charac�er of nuclear weapons requires
dimensions of concern and action that go beyond the national
to the universal. Though no one of the world's religions
can speak for all of humanity, they all ground this universal
concern and together may give it powerful expression.
Not only the potential use of nuclear weapons but the very
threat of s4ch use goes beyond all limits of ethical justifica
tion. The Christian theological tradition's criteria for
just war require opposition to nuclear weapons.
The current deterioration of east-west detente, the failure
of arms negotiations, the development and deployment of new
weapons systems which destabilize the supposed balance of
forces on which a precarious deterrence policy has been
based, on the one hand; and the emergence of broadly-based
peace movements at the time of the Second Special Session
of the UN General Assembly, on the other hand, make this
historical period a "kairos" for religious forces to express
their commitment to disarmament.

The sponsoring of such peace conferences is both an authentic
witness of the peace concern of Soviet churches and other
religious groups, and necessary for their legitimation in
Soviet society.
The spectacular form and international scope of such conferences
impresses participants, especially those from the Third World,
with Hoscow as a world center and the Russian Orthodox Church
as an ecumenical center for world order.
The ecumenical experience of the Russian Orthodox church,
plus the growing world-wide consensus of the peace movements,
make it possible to provide a more balanced and open process in
this conference than has been true in some peace conferences
previously hosted in the Soviet Union.

Presuppositions of U.S. participants:
1.

2.

The consultative planning process for this conference gives
promise that the "mistake" of aligning religious forces with
the official "peace policies" of the Soviet government, as
expressed by previous religious conferences with venue in
Moscow, would not be repeated in this conference.
Concern for human rights and religious freedom in countries
with communist governments, while legitimate and needing
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3.

II.

to be expressed in appropriate fora, should not preempt
this conference's proper focus on universal support for
nuclear disarmament.
The obvious tension that participation in this conference
creates between the churches and the present administration
of the U. S. government is accepted as an unintended consequence
of the necessity of creating a universal witness against the
nuclear arms race.

The form and content of the conference
A.

B.

The leadership of the conference in the Presidium and Steering
Committee was relatively balanced, although there was more eastern
than western representatives.
Third World leadership was prominent
and important.
1.

The Steering Committee, unfortunately, met only once during
the conference. It did not decide the most difficult issue
the conference faced in determining whether the representative
of the Dutch Inter-Church Peace Council, Dr. Willem Bartels,
would be allowed to speak to the .plenary.
It is not clear
how, and on what basis, the decision was made to deny him
this opportunity, which he thought had been guaranteed him
before coming. His withdrawal from the conference was
unfortunate, and the ambiguity of the decision making process
related thereto is a cloud on the democratic and open nature
of the conference process.

2.

The Drafting Committee functioned in a creative and open way.
The texts prepared beforehand were discarded. This had the
disadvantage of a diverse group having to begin with blank
pages. The result was something less than poetry, but is an
authentic expression of the mind of the conference. Only two
issues were negotiated "subrosa" because of the Muslim
insistence on criticism of Israel's policies and the U.S.
insistence on balanced references to U. S. and U. S.S. R. dis
armament initiatives. Arie Brouwer and Bruce Rigdon of the
U. S. A. played a creative role on this committee.

The content of the papers prepared and (partially) delivered, on
the whole, was at a high level theologically, ethically and politically.
1.

This must be especially affirmed of Patriarch Pimen's address,
which was maliciously reported in the U. S. press as "lashing out"
at the U. S. In eleven pages of profound theological and ethical
discussion, there was only one sentence commending the Soviet
decision to introduce a moratorium on the deployment of medium
range missles in the European part of the Soviet Union, and
three sentences deploring the NATO decision to deploy American
medium-range missles in Western Europe. The gentle conclusion
of that only political paragraph was that this problem must "be
settled at the table of open and candid negotiation rather than
through further spiraling of the arms race. "
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2.

C.

·

D.

III.

The addresses of Arie Brouwer, Billy Graham and JoAnne Kagiwada
of the U.S.A. all were excellent, despite the incoherence of an
apocalyptic element in Dr. Graham's address that had little
relation to anything else he said.

The most clearly negative content of the conference came in the almost
endless series of formal greetings--forty in all--that were given during
the plenary session. Though this is an old orthodox tradition, it has
little justification in an ecumenical conference. They provide oppor
tunity for some to enunciate political diatribes whose only apparent
function is to be quoted in partisan .newspapers back home. Such
"greetings" not only have a negative effect on the ecumenical ethos
of the conference, bu� create such time pressures on the plenary
schedule that addresses commissioned at the invitation of the planning
committee cannot be adequately del,ivered, and there is no time at all
for plenary discussion.
The conference thus woefully lacked opportunity for creative public
interchange. From this standpoint it hardly deserves this honorable
designation; there was all too little public conferring. There was
genuinely creative interchange in private conversations outside the
plenary sessions. But language barriers severely limit these
possibilities because the elaborate translation facilities are
available only during the formal sessions.

The Results of the conference:
A,·

The documents adopted by the conference are good and useful. As Bishop
David Preus said, they are "clearly even-handed." It is important to
emphasize his evaluation, because his statement on the second day of
the conference, when he took the chair to preside at the plenary, was
widely quoted in the U.S. press: "the conference is in danger of
becoming a political forum heavily tilted against the West." This
was an appropriate warning at that time, particularly in response to
some of the "greetings. " But at the end Bishop Preus said, the final
documents "can be transmitted to any of our churches for study and action
without apology." I think this was the evaluation of the entire U.S.
delegation. These documents articulate the moral consensus of the world's
religions opposing the nuclear arms race as a threat to the sanctity of
human life.

B.

The media attention given to Billy Graham's participation must be judged
ambivalently. Without him, U.S. media may have paid little or no attention
to the conference at all. On the other hand, the focus on some of his
ill-advised comments seriously distorted the reporting of the conference.
The media focus became what our government wanted it to be: human rights
rather than nuclear disarmament. This parallels the dichotomy in the
Helsinki process, where the U.S. opposes our national concern for human
rights to the Soviet concern for disarmament. These two concerns must
become compltmentary in the policies of both governments.

C.

U.S. churches should use the results of this conference as an important
part of the process now gathering momentum in our society and churches

'
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for peace and disarmament. The media distortion may be creatively used to teach
that there is a positive correlation between detente, disarmament and the realiza
tion of human rights. Public protests of human rights violations also have a
proper place, but the churches must show that finally it is the increase of trust
and the decrease of military tension which provides the better climate for internal
change in any society. This is precisely the focus of The Churches' Human Rights
Programme for the Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, sponsored by the
National Council of Churches in the U.S. A., the Canadian Council of Churches
and the Conference of European Churches.

